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This paper identifies factors to be looked at when considering the extent to which 
decisions within government should be centralised or decentralised.  In practice, the 
solution is almost always likely to involve a balance between centralised and 
decentralised decision-making.  Nevertheless there are a number of common factors that 
are generally applicable to questions of centralisation and decentralisation.  This paper 
identifies those factors in order to provide some guidance for decisions regarding the 
location of decision rights.  Rather than being prescriptive, the paper simply presents the 
relevant issues for consideration.  Centralisation (or decentralisation) is a complex and 
multi-dimensional issue.  It is partly for this reason that the paper does not suggest any 
specific solutions.  The solution in any particular case will involve tradeoffs between the 
factors identified in the paper as well as value judgements regarding the ranking of the 
various factors.  
In determining the appropriate balance between centralised and decentralised decisions, 
various factors are in tension.  Centralisation  can help ensure uniform and consistent 
standards, minimise inequalities, avoid the duplication of services, allow for the 
achievement of economies of scale, and increase coherence and coordination.   
Decentralisation, on the other hand,  can help enhance  local autonomy and 
empowerment, encourage customisation and innovation, and increase participation. 
Economic, social, managerial and constitutional perspectives offer a number of theoretical 
frameworks that are useful in considering issues of centralisation/decentralisation.  This 
paper draws together ideas from across these perspectives.  It concludes that the solution 
is likely to be characterised by a “tight/loose” pattern whereby there is “tight” or centralised 
control over the major objectives that is then joined by “loose” or decentralised discretion 
over the ways in which those objectives are achieved to varying degrees. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  D73 - Bureaucracy, administrative processes in public organisations 
H19 - Structure and scope of government 
KEYWORDS  Centralisation; decentralisation; decision rights. 
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Striking a Balance: 
Centralised and Decentralised 
Decisions in Government 
1 Introduction 
This paper identifies factors to be considered when thinking about the extent to which 
functions within government should be centralised or decentralised.  The intention of the 
paper is to assist those considering questions about the extent to which functions such as 
human resource management, purchasing, or specific output delivery should be 
centralised, both across the public sector and within agencies.  The paper does not 
suggest specific solutions, which will depend on the particular decision and circumstances 
in each individual case.  Often the solution lies in a “tight/loose” fit between centralisation 
and decentralisation
1.  
By this “tight/loose” fit I mean a pattern whereby there is “tight” or 
centralised direction and coordination over the major objectives and “loose” or 
decentralised discretion and autonomy over many of the ways to achieve those overall 
objectives. 
This is a high level paper that attempts to highlight the relevant issues to consider when 
thinking about centralising or decentralising decision rights rather than anything more 
prescriptive.  Centralisation (or decentralisation) is a complex and multidimensional issue.  
It is partly for this reason that the paper does not suggest any specific solutions.  The 
solution in any particular case will involve tradeoffs between the factors identified in this 
paper and is likely to involve some value judgement regarding the ranking of the various 
factors.  This paper aims to identify the relevant issues to consider when faced with a 
(de)centralisation question and in doing so, should provide a pathway through some of the 
complexities involved. 
The paper seeks to answer the question: “According to what factors should authority be 
allocated?” Generalisations in this area can be dangerous and the solution is almost 
always likely to involve a balance between centralised and decentralised decision-making.  
Nevertheless there are a number of common factors that are generally applicable to 
(de)centralisation questions.  This paper identifies those factors in order to provide some 
guidance for decisions regarding the level of centralisation or decentralisation.   
In determining the degree of centralisation, various values are in tension.  Advocates of 
centralisation often contend that it ensures uniform and consistent standards, minimises 
inequalities, avoids the duplication of services, allows for the achievement of economies 
                                                                 
1 The concept of a “tight/loose”  fit between centralisation and decentralisation originated with Peters and Waterman, 1984.  
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of scale, and increases coherence and coordination.  Advocates of decentralisation, on 
the other hand, point to the enhancement of local autonomy and empowerment, greater 
customisation and innovation, and increased participation as benefits of decentralisation 
(Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh 1996). 
Economic, social, managerial and constitutional perspectives offer a number of theoretical 
frameworks that are useful in considering issues of (de)centralisation.  This paper draws 
together arguments from across these perspectives and identifies common factors 
applicable to (de)centralisation questions. 
Each of these factors points either to centralisation or decentralisation of decision-making, 
all other things being equal as shown in Tables 1 and 2.  Resolving (de)centralisation 
questions requires tradeoffs to be made (such as that between the agency costs of 
inconsistent goals that increase as decentralisation increases, and the costs of gathering 
and processing information, that decrease as decentralisation increases).  Different 
factors may dominate depending on the particular decision and circumstances.  
Table 1 - Factors implying centralisation 
Factor Examples 
Decisions requiring knowledge of central information, that it is not practical 
to transfer, an understanding of the needs of the system overall, or 
knowledge of a number of different organizations and non-localised tradeoffs  
Whole of government resource allocation 
The need for accountability for key judgements to remain clearly with the 
democratically elected government 
Key judgements about public policy 
values, trade-offs between organisations, 
broad resourcing and taxation issues 
The need for the government to manage processes closely in order to 
manage risk more directly  
Management of an international relations 
crisis 




Decisions where it is possible to achieve economies of scope  “Brokerage” roles, budget-setting 
functions, spreading “best practice” 
The need for coherence and coordination across the public sector   Leadership on core public policy values 
The need for uniform and consistent national standards and guidelines   Benefit entitlement and eligibility rules, 
tax administration and rulings 
Issues where it is difficult to specify the contract or provide suitable 
incentives for a subordinate to carry out government objectives 
Defence 
Often, the solution to questions of (de)centralisation is likely to involve a combination of 
centralised and decentralised functions.  This solution is likely to be characterised by a 
“tight/loose” pattern whereby there is “tight” or centralised control over the major 
objectives that is then joined by “loose” or decentralised discretion over the ways in which 
those objectives are achieved to varying degrees.   
                                                                 
2 The New Zealand Debt Management Office (DMO) is the debt manager of the central government of New Zealand. DMO manage the 
risk associated with the Government’s fixed income portfolio. The account balances of all New Zealand dollar Crown and departmental 
bank accounts are consolidated at the end of each banking day. The net balance is then moved to the Crown settlement account at the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. This practice (called the overnight cash ‘sweep’) makes use of economies of scale to help achieve 
efficient cash management.   
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Table 2 - Factors implying decentralisation 
Factor Examples 
Localised non-transferable (or transferable only at a prohibitively high cost) 
information, knowledge and relationships  
Judgements about supplementary benefit 
payments 
Issues requiring customisation, innovation and a flexibility to respond to 
localised conditions  
Business development initiatives 
Situations where there is a span of control problem   Specific functions are decentralised from 
doctors to nurses (and from nurses to 
nurse aides) as doctors are unable to 
make all the decisions relating to the 
care of their patients 
Issues where community involvement, local empowerment and local 
participation are important  
Community employment schemes 
The need to avoid an unnecessary concentration of power and the risk of 
abuse of power by distancing a decision from political or central bureaucratic 
control 
Specific functions may be decentralised 
to limit the power of Ministers to other 
entities such as the Police Complaints 
Authority and the Commerce 
Commission (decisions under the 
Commerce and Fair Trading Acts) 
This paper discusses questions of (de)centralisation in more detail, providing some 
background on the various perspectives, (economic, social, managerial and 
constitutional), the theoretical frameworks within each of these perspectives, and the 
arguments that can be drawn from them.  From these arguments common factors relating 
to questions of (de)centralisation are identified. 
2  What is decentralisation? 
There is much debate concerning the definition of “decentralisation” (or “centralisation” as 
the converse), especially with regard to how its definition differs from that of “devolution” 
or “delegation”.  For the purposes of this paper decentralisation is taken to mean the 
locating of decision-making rights or responsibilities away from the centre, whether this be 
to a Crown entity from a Minister, to a department from a central agency or from a 
department’s head office to a regional office.  Typically decentralisation involves the 
spreading out of decision-making authority from a smaller to a larger number of actors 
(Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998). The discussion in this paper concerning the allocation 
of decision-making rights applies also to the decentralisation of operations, resources and 
the allocation of rights more generally.  These rights might include: the right to initiate or 
propose, the right to ratify, the right to veto, the right to set conditions, the right to 
determine in the event of a dispute, the right to deal with exceptions, the right to allocate 
resources and so on. 
Centralisation (and decentralisation) should, for the purposes of this paper, be interpreted 
in a broad sense.  That is, centralisation does not necessarily refer solely to decision-
making by central agencies or ministers.  For example, centralisation may occur at a local 
level or at a regional level.  The location of decision rights (centralised or decentralised) is 
not intended to be a linear concept for the purposes of this paper.  Rather, it may be multi-
dimensional with the solution to (de)centralisation questions likely to lie in a combination 
of centralised and decentralised decision rights. 
The issue of centralisation versus decentralisation is particularly relevant in the context of 
the new communications and information technologies becoming available, as well as in  
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light of the Review of the Centre report
3
.  Improved communications and information 
technologies change the costs of information and of information exchange.  This may in 
some cases mean it is easier to centralise decision-making, as information is more easily 
transferred to the centre, similarly, in some cases it may make it easier to decentralise 
decision-making. 
This study aims to provide a building block for thinking about centralisation or 
decentralisation decisions coming out of the Review of the Centre (particularly in the 
areas of human resources, central agency leadership and e-government).    
3  Factors influencing (de)centralisation 
Economic, social, managerial and constitutional perspectives offer a number of useful 
insights when considering questions of centralisation or decentralisation.  These 
perspectives are briefly described in the Appendix.  As a summary of the four 
perspectives we might say an economic perspective maximises effectiveness and 
efficiency while a social perspective seeks, in addition, to enhance social well-being 
through mechanisms such as participation.  A constitutional perspective introduces the 
notions of democracy, separation of powers and the rule of law, thus, in considering 
centralising or decentralising decision rights, the current legal and constitutional 
frameworks must be taken into account.  A managerial perspective emphasises giving 
managers the authority to make decisions and holding them accountable.  This paper 
draws together approaches from across these perspectives to identify the relevant issues 
to consider when thinking about centralising or decentralising decision rights.   
Centralisation (or decentralisation) is a complex and multidimensional issue.  Without 
seeking to understate the complexities, this paper seeks to identify the issues and provide 
a pathway through some of them.  The paper first discusses centralisation of decision-
making rights and then decentralisation of decision-making rights.  Sometimes, as in the 
case of information asymmetries, different sides of the same coin can lead in different 
directions.   
3.1  Centralised information, knowledge and perspectives 
There are a number of sources of information asymmetries that mean in some 
circumstances centralised decision-making can enable better, more timely and more 
appropriate decision-making.  These information asymmetries are most prevalent in 
decisions relating to the interest of the nation as a whole, judgements that impact on the 
whole system and decisions regarding key public policy values and broad taxation and 
resourcing issues.  Through the use of the information available at the centre (regarding 
government objectives, high-level direction, foreign policy, the availability of resources 
etc.), centralisation may permit a greater level of responsiveness to government 
objectives.  It also means that decisions requiring such information (eg, an understanding 
of the needs of the system overall, or of different organisations) may be better taken at the 
centre.   
                                                                 
3 “The Review of the Centre” report presents the findings and recommendations of a review of the centre of the New Zealand State 
sector conducted over a four-month period in 2001 by a Ministerial Advisory Group.  
WP 02/15 |  Striking a Balance: Centralised and Decentralised 
Decisions in Government 
5
 
3.2 Constitutional  issues 
In some circumstances there may be a constitutional imperative for elected 
representatives to be directly responsible and accountable for decisions, such as those 
relating to key government objectives and broad taxation and resourcing issues.  This 
constitutional argument for centralised decision-making may be in part motivated by a 
concern to address the informational asymmetries that favour centralisation, as well as 
concerns about legitimacy, buy-in, accountability and incentives.   
Centralisation of decision-making rights can be used to ensure accountability remains with 
Ministers who have the democratic mandate to undertake decisions.  Such control over 
decision-making allows the government to more directly pursue its objectives and control 
the allocation of resources through the closer coupling of taxation and expenditure 
decisions.  This may be of particular importance for decisions relating to key judgements 
about public policy values, tradeoffs between different organisations, and broad 
resourcing and taxation issues. 
3.3 Risk  management 
Centralisation may also allow the government to manage processes more closely and 
thus manage risks more directly.  Central risk management may be appropriate in many 
cases due to the information that is held at the centre.  For example, the budget process 
may be managed at the centre as the centre has access to information spanning across 
the public sector and, as a result, is better able to manage risks.  However, there are also 
incentive and control considerations regarding risk management.  It may be the case that 
Ministers have better incentives to manage risk than departments and other decentralised 
decision-makers.  This might explain, for example, why only the Minister of Finance has 
the authority to raise a loan on behalf of the Crown (see also the related discussion later 
in the paper on incentive problems).   
Table 3 - Information, constitutional and risk management factors 
Factors Examples 
Decisions requiring knowledge of central information, that it is not practical to 
transfer, an understanding of the needs of the system overall, or knowledge 
of a number of different organisations and non-localised tradeoffs imply 
centralised decision-making.   
Whole of government resource 
allocation 
The need for accountability for key judgements to remain clearly with the 
democratically elected government implies centralised decision-making.    
Key judgements about public policy 
values, tradeoffs between 
organisations, broad resourcing and 
taxation issues 
The need for the government to manage processes closely in order to 
manage risk more directly implies centralised decision-making.   
Management of an international 
relations crisis 
 
3.4  Economies of scale and scope 
The achievement of economies of scale and scope may also suggest centralisation of 
some decision rights.  Economies of scale can arise when similar operations are 
combined in order to achieve increased output without increasing fixed costs.  For 
example, combining “back office” functions may be achieved in a decentralised way (eg, 
through shared services).  However, the achievement of economies of scale often 
requires some centralisation of decision rights due to the level of coordination required  
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across the sector.  This is particularly the case when individual agencies have only weak 
incentives to look for efficiencies through collaboration (as an individual agency receives 
only a fraction of the total efficiency gain yet could bear the majority of the costs from 
attempting to set up collaborative arrangements).   
Economies of scope, on the other hand, can arise as a result of combining different 
operations and functions.  The gains from economies of scope are closely related to the 
information asymmetries that favour centralisation.  For example, there are economies of 
scope in having a centralised budget process where information across the public sector 
is available in budget setting.  Furthermore, there are economies of scope in combining 
the budget-setting process and macro-economic forecasting within the one organisation.  
The complementarities between economic and fiscal policy functions lead to the 
achievement of economies of scope. 
It may, however, be possible to realise economies of scale and scope through careful 
structuring and contracting of activities, still allowing decentralised decision-making.  For 
example, in some cases the benefits of economies of scale can be purchased from the 
market through outsourcing.  Gupta and Eerola (1997) note that the ability to obtain 
economies of scale and scope may provide enhanced opportunities for innovation due to 
the ability to specialise and to better utilise technology. 
Economies of scale and scope are closely related to each other and also to the 
achievement of coordination and consistency.  For example, E-government initiatives can 
increase coordination across the sector by ensuring computer systems and information 
technology are compatible across departments.  This consistency allows the achievement 
of economies of scope by enabling the use of an information network, and can also result 
in economies of scale as the central agency may have greater purchasing power when 
buying in large quantities.    
3.5  Coordination and consistency 
Centralisation can also aid in achieving a strong and unified culture with the centre 
conveying coherence and clarity of direction.  This can be beneficial from an efficiency 
point of view, for example it is efficient to have the Crown Law Office
4
 as an authoritative 
figure providing legal opinions.  This may reduce the cost and time involved in determining 
the legal considerations relevant to a particular issue. Where the costs of decision-making 
are high, centralised policies can help avoid the costs of duplicating information and 
decision-making (Kerr, Claridge and Milicich 1998).  
In addition, centralisation may provide advantages in ensuring uniform and consistent 
national standards, minimising regional and social inequalities, and reducing variability 
Aucoin and Bakvis 1988).  In this way centralisation of certain decisions, such as benefit 
entitlements and eligibility criteria may increase equity. 
                                                                 
4 The Crown Law Office provides legal advice and representation to the New Zealand Government on matters affecting the Crown, and 
in particular, government departments.  
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Table 4 - Economies of scale and scope, coordination and consistency factors 
Factors Examples 
Decisions where it is possible to achieve economies of scale imply 
centralised decision-making. 
New Zealand Debt Management 
Office’s overnight cash “sweep” 
Decisions where it is possible to achieve economies of scope imply 
centralised decision-making. 
“Brokerage” roles, budget-setting 
functions, spreading “best practice” 
The need for coherence and coordination across the public sector implies 
centralised decision-making. 
Leadership on core public policy values 
The need for uniform and consistent national standards and guidelines 
implies centralised decision-making. 
Benefit entitlement and eligibility rules, 
tax administration and rulings 
 
3.6  Decentralised information, knowledge and 
relationships 
The existence of information asymmetries mean that in some cases decentralised 
decision-making may enable more timely and better decisions to be made.  That is, 
decentralisation may enable location-specific information, knowledge and relationships to 
be used to make the best decision.  The quality of decision-making may be improved by 
moving the point of decision-making closer to those affected by it.  Those with more 
accurate and up to date information can respond to client needs more effectively than 
those at the centre.  In this way decentralisation may improve resource allocation in the 
public sector and better meet client needs.  The presence of this “particular” knowledge is 
a prime rationale for the decentralisation of more responsibility for input choices to Chief 
Executives and away from central agencies (together with the need to increase 
accountability, discussed later in the paper). 
Through the use of this location-specific information, decentralisation can foster greater 
diversity and choice, and encourage innovation and flexibility to respond to change.     
North (1990) notes that decentralised decision-making enables societies to explore 
alternative ways of solving problems In this way decentralisation may enhance adaptive 
efficiency and encourage greater innovation. Decentralisation can offer a greater 
opportunity to customise services and publicly provided goods to specific circumstances.  
This leads to the rationale, first expressed by Tiebout (1956) that decentralised decision-
making enables the diversification and customisation of publicly provided goods and 
decisions in accordance with “local” preferences. 
3.7 Incentive  problems 
Where location-specific information is required for decision-making this suggests 
decentralisation.  However, this assumes close alignment of the interests of decision-
makers at the rim with the objectives of the government (as mandated by voters).  Thus, 
in considering the location of decision-making rights it is important to consider the 
incentives of decision-makers and whether those incentives can be aligned with policy 
objectives through mechanisms such as decision makers’ values, inherent incentives, 
performance monitoring, the desire to maintain reputation, or contractual arrangements 
(see also the related section later in the paper on decentralisation as a way to reduce the 
risk of the abuse of power, which discusses incentive problems associated with 
centralisation).    
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Decentralisation increases the risk that perverse motivations may be a problem and may 
increase the difficulty in aligning the interests of decision-makers with the objectives of the 
democratically elected government.  Decentralisation of decision-making is closely related 
to the notion of giving managers and departments the freedom to manage those things 
they can manage well and holding them to account (Treasury 1987).  This freedom to 
manage increases the importance of taking steps to ensure incentives are aligned through 
the use of performance monitoring, the establishment of a code of conduct and greater 
management of accountability processes by the centre (Aucoin 1995).  In this way 
decentralisation of certain decision-making powers may also lead to an increase in the 
role of the centre in monitoring performance. 
Incentive problems, together with the desire to manage risk, create a pressure to 
centralise decision-making.  However, this may be costly.  Centralising decision-making 
that requires localised information leads to two possible sources of costs: Either, the costs 
of transferring information (including reducing the likelihood of a timely decision); or, the 
costs of not transferring the relevant information (poor decisions). 
Table 5 - Information and incentive factors 
Factors Examples 
Localised non-transferable (or transferable only at a prohibitively high cost) 
information, knowledge and relationships imply decentralisation. 
Judgements about supplementary 
benefit payments 
Issues requiring customisation, innovation and a flexibility to respond to 
localised conditions imply decentralisation of decision-making control. 
Business development initiatives 
Issues where it is difficult to specify the contract or provide suitable 




3.8  Diseconomies of scale and scope 
Decentralisation can avoid diseconomies of scale and scope. People have limited 
capacity, limited knowledge and time to acquire and evaluate new information in order to 
make good decisions (Kasper and Streit 1998). Thus, decentralisation may be used to 
avoid the concentration of an enormous load of decision-making on a few people and 
resources at the centre (Gorringe 1996).  In some cases, this span of control problem may 
be able to be solved by shifting decision rights further from the centre, or by shifting 
decision rights to another agency the same distance from the centre. 
3.9 Participation 
There may be value in local participation in decision-making, whether or not that in itself 
leads to better decisions.  Local and regional autonomy may be enhanced through 
decentralised decision-making, thus enabling a greater degree of power sharing, 
community involvement, and sense of empowerment.  For this reason, decentralised 
decision-making may be more durable even when it is not the most “efficient” option when 
measured by narrower criteria.  Decentralisation can be used to provide a flatter, less 
hierarchical and more empowering structure. This may lead to greater motivation and job 
satisfaction due to those further from the centre having a higher degree of freedom, 
discretion and control over their work (Child 1984).  
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3.10  Limiting power and providing independence 
Decentralisation can also help avoid an unnecessary concentration of power and reduce 
direct control and dictated direction (at least from the centre).  While Parliament (and 
Ministers) may decide the executive branch of government should undertake a function, 
they may also decide that it is not appropriate for Ministers or core central bureaucrats to 
exercise certain decision rights, and may provide a clear commitment to this by providing 
statutory independence (Tirole 1994).  This may involve some decentralising of decision 
rights from Ministers, at the centre, to other organisations such as Crown Entities or other 
statutory bodies.  In this way decentralisation of decision rights may provide for some 
separation of powers, thus reducing the risk of abuse of power.  This may also be 
important in signalling independence from Ministers to the public.  Providing this credible 
commitment to independence from political control is not necessarily the same as 
decentralisation, although it may often be achieved through some decentralisation of 
decision rights. 
Table 6 - Diseconomies of scale and scope, participation and constitutional factors 
Factors Examples 
Situations where there is a span of control problem may imply 
decentralisation. 
Specific functions are decentralised 
from doctors to nurses (and from 
nurses to nurse aids) as doctors are 
unable to make all the decisions 
relating to the care of their patients 
Issues where community involvement, local empowerment and local 
participation are important imply decentralised decision-making power. 
Community employment schemes 
The need to avoid an unnecessary concentration of power and the risk of 
abuse of power by distancing a decision from political or central bureaucratic 
control may involve decentralisation. 
Specific functions may be 
decentralised to limit the power of 
Ministers to other entities such as the 
Police Complaints Authority and the 
Commerce Commission (decisions 
under the Commerce and Fair Trading 
Acts) 
4  The allocation of decision rights 
The above discussion leads us to a combination of centralised and decentralised decision 
rights characterised by a “tight/loose” fit with “tight” or centralised decision-making over 
issues that have “whole system” implications such as: major government objectives, key 
public policy values and broad taxation and resourcing decisions.  “Loose” or 
decentralised decision-making may be appropriate, in contrast, over many other decisions 
in order to enable those with better information, knowledge and relationships with clients 
to make more appropriate and timely decisions.   
Thus, a tight/loose pattern of decision-making is characterised by a clarity of objectives 
and values that is articulated and enforced by the centre.  While, at the same time, those 
at the coal-face are given the freedom to manage (and the associated accountability) in 
order to ensure the best decisions. Scott (2001) discusses a similar notion, which he calls 
“strategic management”. He notes, “strategic management is about promoting direction, 
purpose and transformation from the management centre, while preserving the devolved 
management that is essential for quality and innovation in service delivery and also 
creativity in policy analysis.” (Scott 2001:321)   
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The presence of location-specific information and the need for customisation suggests 
decentralised discretion and control over how client needs are met.  Centralised control 
over the overall objectives allows responsiveness to government objectives and ensures 
alignment with those objectives while decentralised control over how those objectives are 
achieved prevents the risk of decision-makers becoming detached from the needs of 
clients and enhances innovation and flexibility in service delivery.   
Decentralised discretion and autonomy over the ways in which the government’s key 
objectives are achieved may help allocate decision-making rights to those with the 
comparative advantage to undertake them, thus preventing the concentration of an 
enormous load of decision-making on a few people and resources.  For example, some 
decisions relating to service delivery should be allocated to those at the frontline while 
politicians undertake significant resource allocation decisions and determine the major 
objectives of the government. Decentralised decision-making does not eliminate the need 
for central coordination, indeed, it may strengthen that need in order to address the 
fragmentation resulting from decentralisation of authority to a larger number of decision-
makers (Hart 1998). 
Incentive problems must be taken into account when adopting a decentralised allocation 
of decision-making rights.  In order to maintain centralised control over major objectives, 
increased performance monitoring, a combination of value/cultural alignment, and greater 
management of accountability processes by the centre may be necessary. 
Decentralised discretion over the ways in which government objectives are achieved 
allows for greater participation and community involvement.  Centralised control where 
national guidelines and standards are required enables “tight” control over government 
objectives.  For example, there may be national standards relating to equal employment 
opportunities while other decisions regarding employment conditions are decentralised to 
fit the requirements of specific organisations and employees. 
Through a tight/loose pattern of centralised and decentralised decision-making it may be 
possible to achieve the benefits of one approach without losing many of the benefits of the 
other.  For example when decentralising decision-making rights a “tight/loose” approach 
suggests it may also be appropriate to use incentive mechanisms, contracts, guidelines, 
reporting requirements and performance monitoring.  And when centralising decision-
making rights it may be appropriate to adopt additional mechanisms such as consultation 
processes, surveys on results and reporting mechanisms.  This enables a clarity of 
objectives and values to be articulated and enforced by the centre while managers with 
the location-specific knowledge are given the freedom to manage in order to make the 
best decisions.   
4.1 Examples 
The following examples show how a tight/loose pattern of decision-making might look in 
practice.  These examples show that the solution often lies in a combination of centralised 
and decentralised decision rights, typically characterised by tight or centralised control 
over major objectives and loose or decentralised discretion and autonomy over how those 
objectives are achieved.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the issues 
relevant to each example but rather a useful way of considering the practical application of 
a tight/loose pattern of decision rights.     
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4.1.1 Human  resources 
One of the most important areas of information in this case is that relating to the 
performance of staff.  On a daily basis this is most likely to be observed by “front line” 
managers.  While some information relating to the performance of staff is likely to be 
transferable, it is important that the section managers have the rights and powers to 
respond to staffing issues as they arise.   Within a department the responsibility for the 
day-to-day management of staff needs to rest with the person who has the relevant 
information.   
If the Chief Executives of departments are to be held accountable for the actions of their 
staff then they should have the rights and responsibilities associated with being an 
employer.  For example, they may have discretion over whom they employ and over many 
of the conditions of employment but not around some of core public sector competencies.  
Related to the issue of accountability is the need to ensure adequate incentives for Chief 
Executives.  This requires performance monitoring, likely to be undertaken by central 
agencies. 
There is a need for some public sector wide and economy wide standards, for example 
equal opportunities policies and safe working conditions.  The setting and monitoring of 
such standards, therefore, may be centralised.   
Economies of scale may be possible in areas such as advertising vacant positions (central 
agencies may provide a valuable brokerage role, for instance, in managing a vacancy 
web-site) and training of staff.  However these benefits may be outweighed by the cost of 
obtaining the relevant information from departments. 
Thus the solution is likely to result in a combination of centralised and decentralised 
functions, with day to day management of human resources and decisions regarding the 
allocation of resources (such as remuneration) decentralised to departments while central 
agencies set and monitor public sector wide standards (such as EEO policies).   
4.1.2 Benefits  payments 
In this case there is a need for national guidelines outlining basic entitlements, including 
who is entitled to a benefit and the amount of the entitlement, in order to ensure national 
consistency, fiscal control and an equitable access to benefits.  The setting and 
monitoring of such guidelines, therefore, is likely to be centralised. 
However, front line staff need to decide whether an individual fits the eligibility criteria.  
Again this is necessary in order to ensure equitable access to benefits.  Front line staff 
also need to have some decision-making rights in order to ensure timely decisions are 
made, particularly with regard to supplementary benefit payments and emergency 
assistance.  Thus, while guidelines and standards may be set centrally, it is important that 
other decision making rights (such as the right to deal with some exceptions, the right to 
decide eligibility etc) relating to service delivery are decentralised to frontline staff in order 
to enable a timely and appropriate decision to be made. 
Economies of scale may be possible in back office”functions such as organising and 
facilitating regular payments.  Thus, these types of functions may be performed by a 
central office or by a shared services centre. 
Again, the solution is likely to lie in a combination of centralised and decentralised 
functions, with front line staff having the discretion to make some decisions regarding  
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eligibility while the setting of basic entitlements and eligibility guidelines and standards are 
set centrally and with some centralisation of back office functions. 
4.2 Maori 
There are two ways of looking at centralisation and decentralisation questions with regard 
to Maori.  First, given that the Treaty of Waitangi is between Maori and the Crown, Maori 
need to be able to deal directly with the Crown (ie, Ministers and their direct advisors) on 
Treaty of Waitangi related issues.   
Second, the tribal based nature of the Maori community and a recognition that the Treaty 
of Waitangi was signed by chiefs on behalf of their iwi, rather than on behalf of a Maori 
nation, suggest that enhancing the responsiveness of the public sector to Maori clients 
may require greater decentralisation.  A more participative mode of decision-making may 
be required to empower Maori, enhance local accountability for Maori issues and ensure 
public services are more responsive to particular communities and cultural groups, 
including Maori.  Decentralised decision-making can serve as a tool to ensure Maori 
clients are better informed about government services; ensure public agencies are more 
aware of the social, economic and cultural influences affecting Maori; ensure government 
services are more relevant to the needs of Maori; ensure Maori clients have a greater 
sense of ownership; and improve client access to services through the removal of social, 
physical and psychological impediments (Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh 1996).  
Both perspectives (the first in favour of centralisation and the second in favour of 
decentralisation) are relevant, and in some cases, both may be relevant to the same 
issues. 
4.3 Central  agencies 
The factors and underlying frameworks in this paper are particularly relevant with regard 
to the role of central agencies.  The factors derived from the various perspectives help to 
answer key questions concerning the role of central agencies: 
Which functions are most efficiently and effectively done at the centre? 
How directive should central agencies be? 
Should any of the functions currently undertaken by central agencies be decentralised? 
Are there any additional functions that should be undertaken by central agencies?  
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The combination of factors identified in this paper, in general, leads to the conclusion that 
decisions relating to the government’s major objectives, including high-level service 
delivery goals, high-level fiscal goals, decisions regarding key public policy values, trade-
offs between different organisations, and broad resource and taxation issues should be 
allocated close to the centre.  In contrast, decisions relating to many of the ways in which 
those objectives are achieved should be decentralised to those with better information, 
knowledge and relationships with clients in order to increase participation, customisation 
and innovation, and flexibility and responsiveness to clients.    
Thus, working through the factors outlined in this paper when considering centralising or 
decentralising decision rights tends to lead to a solution characterised by a “tight/loose” 
pattern of (de)centralisation.  This tight/loose pattern embodies tight or centralised 
direction and coordination over the major objectives and loose or decentralised discretion 
and autonomy over many of the ways to achieve them.   
This paper has not attempted to rank the common factors in order of importance, as the 
ranking is likely to differ depending on the particular circumstances.  The final solution in 
any individual case is likely to involve some value judgement between the relative weights 
of the different factors.  However, the paper does suggest that the solution in each case is 
almost certain to lie in some combination of centralised and decentralised functions and 
that this combination is likely to be characterised by a tight/loose pattern.      
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Appendix - The perspectives 
Economic, social, constitutional and managerial perspectives offer a number of useful 
insights into questions regarding the centralisation or decentralisation of decision-making 
rights.  The issues discussed in this paper are drawn from across the perspectives briefly 
discussed below. 
Economic Perspectives 
From an economic viewpoint there are a number of theories that can assist in considering 
the issue of centralisation versus decentralisation. Significant examples include: 
•  Neoclassical economic theory provides a number of tools that are of particular use 
in considering centralisation/decentralisation questions, including: 
−  the use of production functions to determine the efficient level of activity; 
−  the ability to achieve economies of scale and scope; and 
−  the notion of comparative advantage. 
•  A second theoretical framework is that of agency theory.  Agency theory rests on the 
notion that social, political and economic interactions can be viewed as a series of 
explicit or implicit “contracts”.  Agency theory assumes individuals are rational self-
interested utility-maximisers.  The interests of agents and principals are often likely to 
conflict.  Furthermore, principal-agent relationships are complicated by incomplete 
information, asymmetric information and the “bounded rationality” of the parties. 
•  Transaction cost economics is similar in many ways to agency theory but places 
greater emphasis on the optimal governance structures for various kinds of 
transactions, suggesting that rational agents will select governance structures that 
minimise the sum of production and transaction costs. 
•  A final theoretical framework is that of public choice theory.  Public Choice Theory 
seeks to explain how people will act in different institutional settings with different 
incentive structures.  Public choice theory assumes human behaviour is dominated by 
self-interest, that is, individuals are rational utility-maximisers.  For this reason 
suggestions that politicians are only concerned with societal well-being and their 




As fully developed and applied, for instance in the work of Peter Gorringe
6
, these theories 
contain a much richer picture than these brief descriptions may suggest.   
Managerial Perspective 
Managerialism describes a body of theory and practice developed by managers, other 
practitioners and academics.  This framework embraces a number of common beliefs.  
Most notable to the issue of (de)centralisation are the following: 
•  the notion of effective management achieved by giving managers the authority, 
resources and freedom to manage; 
                                                                 
5 For a more detailed description on these theories see Eatwell, Milgate and Newman, 1987 
6 Gorringe, 2001  
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•  an emphasis on this devolution of management control coupled with improved 
reporting, monitoring and accountability mechanisms; and 
•  clarity of the role, responsibilities and objective is critically important to the success of 
a managerial approach
7
.   
Social Perspectives 
Efficiency and economy are not the only criteria in deciding the location of decision-
making rights.  From a societal perspective the overriding objective is to enhance social 
well-being.  A social viewpoint provides a number of additional considerations; three of 
which are particularly relevant to decentralisation questions
8
: 
•  Participation refers to the level of public involvement in decision-making, resource 
allocation, and service delivery and the provision of mechanisms for effective local 
participation.  From a societal perspective, social well-being is enhanced through 
community participation and empowerment.  Thus participation has an intrinsic value 
beyond the achievement of efficiency and effectiveness
9
. 
•  Partnership refers to the partnership between the state and other providers, with, for 
example, the state ensuring regulations and standards of provision are met.  The 
notion of partnership involves some joint setting of objectives and ongoing dialogue 
between government and other groups.  This is important from a societal perspective 
as it represents a way in which participation can be extended while retaining some 
control over standards of provision.     
•  Subsidiarity has at its core the notion of empowerment.  The notion of subsidiarity is 
perhaps more relevant when considering a federal system of government.  However, 
it deserves a mention here as it represents another perspective from which to 
consider questions of centralisation and decentralisation.  Subsidiarity refers to the 
notion that decisions and actions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level
10
. 
A social perspective emphasises the benefits of participation and may therefore favour 
decentralisation even where it is not the most economically “efficient” option.   
However a social perspective does not necessarily always favour greater decentralisation, 
for example, it may be the case that participation is best achieved through central 
organisation.  Furthermore, from a social perspective, centralisation may increase equity 
through the provision of uniform and consistent national standards and the reduction of 
regional and social inequalities.  Social well-being may, in this way, be enhanced through 
the reduction in variability and inequalities.   
Constitutional Perspectives 
A constitutional perspective places the emphasis on the allocation and control of public 
power, including accountability for the use of that power – that is, the allocation of some 
fundamental decision rights.   There are a number of important features of our system of 
government that are particularly relevant to the allocation and control of public power, 
notably democracy, the separation of powers, the rule of law: 
                                                                 
7 For more information on what is often referred to as ‘New Public Management’ see the doctrines outlined by Hood and Jackson 
(1991) 
8 Durie, 1988 
9 Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh, 1996 
10 Guerin, 2002  
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•  Democracy: As a democracy, key judgements about public policy values, trade-offs, 
resources and taxation should usually be made by representatives elected by and 
accountable to the people.   The agencies of executive government should be 
accountable to Ministers and Parliament, as the elected representatives of the 
people; 
•  Separation of Powers: At the same time, our system of government allocates 
important powers, and checks on the use of power to different branches of 
government – the judiciary, the executive and the legislature; 
•  Rule of Law: The executive, and other branches of government are bound to obey 
the law.   This is important in terms of shaping and constraining the allocation of 
decision rights, including the degree of centralisation for two reasons.   The first is 
that Parliament is usually careful about the allocation and regulation of statutory 
powers, usually allocating them to a particular office holder or category of office 
holders, and providing some scope to delegate those powers to other persons.   For 
example, the State Sector Act provides quite broad powers for chief executives to 
delegate powers to members of their departments (and for Ministers to delegate 
statutory powers to their chief executives).  Any decentralisation has to be consistent 
with this allocation of decision rights.   The second is that there are some well 
established principles governing how Parliament allocates certain types of powers, 
such as: 
−  What should be covered by primary legislation, and what is appropriate to 
secondary legislation; 
−  Who should have the power to make secondary legislation; 
−  How coercive powers should be exercised. 
Parliament (and Ministers) may also decide that while a function should be undertaken by 
the executive branch of government, with a responsible Minister, that it is not appropriate 
for Ministers to exercise certain decision rights, and may provide a clear commitment to 
this by providing statutory independence.   This can be in either a departmental context 
(eg,  the Commissioner of Inland Revenue in respect of individual taxpayers) or an arms 
length Crown entity context (eg,  Commerce Commission).   Providing this credible 
commitment to independence from political control is not necessarily the same as 
decentralisation, although may often be achieved through some decentralisation of 
decision rights. 
New Zealand is a unitary and relatively centralised state – we do not have a federal 
system of government, and the role of local government is relatively limited.   Parliament 
does, however, allocate some responsibilities in a decentralised way, notably to local 
government, but also to organisations like District Health Boards.   This will usually reflect 
a desire to provide for local democracy or a regional basis for the organisation of some 
decision rights. 